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TRIUMPHS OR FAILINGS OF MODERN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE
CONDITIONS OF ITS PRODUCTION
GEORGE L. PRIEST*
This symposium has successfully convened a set of commentaries
on, and criticisms of, modern legal scholarship that is extraordinarily
diverse. Indeed, at first glance, the diversity is so great as to resemble
discordance: Meir Dan-Cohen's approving explanation of the growth
of theoretical inquiry about the law· seems in conflict with John Henry
Schlegel's lament about the infrequency of studies on the ordering of
legal systems and of their even more infrequent introduction into the
law school curriculum.2 Similarly, Jean Stefancic's illuminating anal-
ysis of the contributions from the rise of law review symposia3 and
Mary Coombs's celebration of the increasing volume of "outsider"
scholarship4 seem to contradict David Bryden's complaints that there
is "too much" modern scholarship and that its style is typically "aw-
ful."s Perhaps curiously, I believe that each of these authors accu-
rately identifies an important feature of modern scholarship. And far
from discordant or contradictory, these various features can be under-
stood by a simple description of modern legal scholarship's conditions
of production. .
Let me first disclaim the comprehensiveness of my own analysis.
Far from a careful study of the conditions of supply of, and demand
for, legal scholarship, my comments are little more than a back-of-the-
envelope sketch. But even a brief review of the organization of the
legal scholarship industry and its changes over the last few decades is
suggestive of the sources of both the criticisms and the encomia we
have seen. . . '
As is hardly controversial, in the decades since the War, the legal
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profession and legal scholarship have been greatly affected by two de-
velopments which I shall simply accept as background conditions:
first, the extraordinary increase in the demand for legal services and,
concomitantly, in the number of law students and law schools to train
them;6 second, the increase in influence of social scientific and human-
istic approaches to understanding and evaluating the law, a trend
which I have described elsewhere.7 I shall not try here to explain
these developments, but only to assert that their implications help to
illuminate the commentaries of the various authors in the symposium.
The first important characteristic of the conditions of production
of legal scholarship is the source of demand for, or "consumption" of,
the product. The demand for law review articles is dominated, not by
consumption by readers or subscribers, but by consumption by student
editors. I am doubtful that there is a single law review or law-related
specialty journal (such as, say, the Journal of Legal Studies or the
Journal of Law and Literature) that supports itself on receipts from
readers or subscribers. All law journals are subsidized in some way:
most by the law schools at which they are published; some specialty
journals, by charitable foundations interested in supporting the partic-
ular subject matter in which the journal concentrates.
What accounts for this extraordinary level of systematic subsidi-
zation? The term "subsidy" is not quite accurate, for journals appear
to be subsidized only when analyzed from the vantage of readers. In
contrast, from the vantage of the law schools that support them, jour-
nals are an investment. Law schools invest in student-edited journals,
among other reasons, as a means of competing both for student appli-
cants and in the market for student placement. As the demand for,
and returns to, lawyers have dramatically increased, the number of
law schools has increased,8 and the competition among them has in-
creased.9 As a consequence, law schools today must compete over all
non-geographically captured students, must compete to place their
graduates in promising positions, and serve to gain from successful
competition both in terms of steady tuition revenues and, where very
successful, of subsequent donations from prosperous alumni. Today,
quite unlike the 194Os, it would be unthinkable for a law school to
conceive of itself as a competitor in either the applicant or placement
6. See B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and
Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & EcON. S3 (1977).
7. George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33
J. LEGAL ED. 437 (1983).
8. See Pashigian, supra note 6.
9. Again, I am describing broad trends since the War, rather than specific competitive conditions
at any moment, and can only recommend more careful study of the problem.
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market without sponsoring a law review. A law review represents a
continuing reputational investment for a law school's students and for
its alumni. In this respect, a law review to a serious law school resem-
bles a winning football team to a major (non-Ivy League) university.
These investments are hardly improvident. Surely, students who
have devoted thousands of hours to editing articles bring more skills to
the marketplace. But the implications of this source of demand for
legal scholarship are very important. The principal demand for legal
scholarship is not a demand by readers, searching for insights; it is a
demand by editors, searching for material to edit. David Bryden's
complaints that there is too much modem legal scholarship and that
its style is bad,1O now become totally comprehensible. A reader may
well conclude that the benefits of much of modem legal scholarship
are less than any estimation of costs, but the calculus misunderstands
the conditions of production. The benefits of much of modem scholar-
ship may not be equal to the opportunity cost of the time value to the
reader-Professor Bryden's complaint-even ignoring publication and
distribution costs, not to mention properly apportioned time costs of
writing the work and, possibly greater, time costs of student editing.
But the benefits to readers of modem scholarship are secondary bene-
fits; the primary benefit is as material upon which students may exer-
cise editorial judgment, thus improving their skills and, in tum, the
reputations of their law schools. It cannot be said that law reviews
demand articles more rather than less susceptible to editing, but the
demand is surely for manuscript pages rather than for novel insights.
What surely follows and what we have surely seen is a plethora of
legal journals in this country and many thousands of annually pub-
lished pages. The second principal consideration for understanding
the characteristics of modem legal scholarship is the determinants of
the allocation of scholarship among these many journals. In more typ-
ical markets, of course, one would predict resources to be allocated
according to highest valued use. Moreover, considering the competi-
tion among the hundreds of law journals for material to publish, one
might imagine the principle of allocating according to highest value to
be especially effective. That simple economic principle, however, is
not very helpful for understanding the allocation of legal scholarship,
largely because the operative "values" directing allocation are com-
plex and often push in different directions.
That is, one might imagine an allocation of scholarship according
to merit, with the emergence of some set of superior or more promi-
nent journals that publish the best work, with journals of slightly
10. Bryden, supra note 5.
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lesser merit publishing the next best work, and so on. An allocation of
that nature, however, is largely foreign to American legal scholarship.
Each of us might be able to list the five or ten best articles of the year
or decade and find that our list overlaps to some extent with those of
other academics. But it is a remote possibility that the consensus best
articles today-perhaps in contrast to earlier decades-would be
found published within a small set of journals.
But the failure of this definition of merit should not be surprising.
Expectations of this nature about allocation according to merit derive
from the vantage of the reader, which again, does not reflect the prin-
cipal operative force in the production of legal scholarship. Most law
journals are edited by students. With respect to the selection of arti-
cles for publication, students cannot be expected to be perfect agents
of journal readers. First, students serve as editors for very short peri-
ods, seldom more than a year, implying little specific personal return
from consistency of production. II Second, given the large number of
journals and the ease to most authors of securing acceptance for publi-
cation, the ratio of time spent editing to time spent authoring is typi-
cally very high. Faculty members at many schools frequently
complain that the student editorial boards at their school's journal
make publication decisions on political grounds or on grounds of per-
sonal preference, all that differ from board to board reducing consis-
tency of quality over time. 12 But if students are spending almost as
much time editing· as the author has spent writing the article, why
shouldn't students accept for publication articles that they prefer to
edit? Again, readers are not paying their way through subscription
revenues in any event. Nevertheless, an allocation mechanism influ-
enced to some degree by merit but probably to a greater degree by
student preferences which change over time leads to some level of ran-
domness in article allocation among legal journals. There have been
two major developments in the production of legal scholarship within
the last two decades that can be interpreted as efforts to overcome this
randomness: the rise of specialized journals and, where interest in a
particular subject is not sufficiently great to sustain a continuing jour-
nal, the rise in symposia issues. The rise of specialized journals and
symposia largely reflect the interests of authors and readers: authors,
II. Faculty-edited journals are substantially different in this respect, especially where individual
faculty members have accepted the position as an important component of their careers. The extraordi-
nary stewardship of the Journal ofLaw and Economics under Aaron Director and Ronald H. Coase is a
prominent example. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance ofLaw and Economics
at Chicago, 1932·1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983).
12. Of course, the more common complaint is that student preferences conflict with a faculty
member's own preference, especially for his or her work.
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to more effectively corral an audience for their work; and readers, es-
pecially readers with particular interests, to reduce the search costs of
identifying material relevant to these interests.
It should be seen at the outset that the advantages of specialized
journals or symposia publications are not equivalent for different types
of legal scholarship. Consider, as examples, three types of articles.
Obviously, articles relating to jurisdictionally-specific legal problems
almost universally are published in a journal within the jurisdiction.
For instance, if I were to write an article on specific questions of prod-
ucts liability law in Connecticut, it would make no sense to publish it
in, say, a Texas journal. The relevant readers of the article are likely
to be lawyers and judges in Connecticut who-once some sorting
mechanism is in place-are unlikely to subscribe to most non-state
journals. Similarly, student editors in Texas will have little interest in
Connecticut law.
In contrast, if I were to write an article addressing a particular
legal problem that could arise in any state, the location of publication
becomes much less important. Articles addressing specific legal issues
or providing specific doctrinal analyses may be seldom read by the
general subscriber population, because they become relevant only
when the reader faces the particular legal issue that is the subject of
the article. Indeed, with the extraordinary improvements recently in
computer-accessed search, the location of publication may be largely a
matter of indifference. As long as the article remains accessible, ran-
dom selection among journals will have no influence on the article's
success.
In further contrast, however, imagine an article written princi-
pally to influence other academics-scholarship of the nature cele-
brated by Meir Dan-Cohen, substantive legal theory.13 For this form
of scholarship, random selection of publication would represent near-
death to the article. Most academics, of course, try to keep current.
But given the large number of legal journals, keeping current is very
costly. Most-including myself-eannot routinely scan large numbers
ofjournals, but rely on published indices, such as the excellent Univer-
sity of Washington journal index. But any index, however helpful
over some range, cannot very successfully alert one to important theo-
retical advances, if only because all indices are necessarily bound to
their own index categories which, by definition, cannot anticipate the-
oretical advances.
It is for this third form of scholarship that the specialized journal
and the symposia are most beneficial because these forms of publica-
13. Dan-Cohen, supra note I.
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tion, by focusing a readership, simultaneously focus authorship. For
academics engaging in scholarly conversation with other academics,
this focus is exceptionally attractive. In my own field, for example,
there are now six specialized journals for articles in law and economics
in addition to large numbers of yearly symposia.
The rise of specialized journals and symposia,14 of course, implies
greater diversity in legal scholarship and greater fragmentation among
the academy. Mary Coombs at once laments that an important group
of scholars are "outsiders" while proudly describing their accomplish-
ments. Specialization in legal scholarship is a broader phenomenon,
however, and is characteristic not only of work related to race and sex,
but to all fields of legal inquiry. IS In this respect, though I do not
mean to diminish the significance of the term for feminists or people of
color, all serious scholars are outsiders working within some narrow
bubble of academic concern. Modem legal scholarship is best charac-
terized as comprising hundreds of specialized bubbles of this nature-
some larger and smaller, some overlapping with others over some
range and departing at others-all advancing toward greater under-
standing of the operation of the law.
As Adam Smith described centuries ago, however, the increasing
division of labor is a measure of the wealth of a culture, not of its
poverty. I share completely my friend Jack Schlegel's concerns about
the continuing traditional focus of much of modem law teaching. 16
But I believe that it is a mistake to evaluate the conditions of modem
legal scholarship from the state of the current law school curriculum.
Indeed, it is a signal of the great strength of modem legal scholarship
that the number of specialized journals and symposia issues have in-
creased so dramatically in recent years. These developments, well
documented in the articles in this very symposium, demonstrate the
power and vitality of modem legal scholarship, a power and vitality
far greater than that of any earlier period of legal education.
14. Documented both in Stefancic, supra note 3, and, for a subset of interests, in Coombs, supra
note 4.
15. See Priest, supra note 7.
16. See Schlegel, supra note 2.
